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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONDoes the Parliament of Canada have the constitutional authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions? Through its Regulatory Framework paper, the federal
government proposes to impose limits on greenhouse gas emissions by large
industrial emitters. Regulatory limits will vary from sector to sector. Each regulated
firm may choose among different options to comply. They may reduce emission
levels to prescribed levels; make contributions to a climate-change technology fund;
or, comply through a cap-and-trade system. Under the cap-and-trade system, a
regulated firm can comply by purchasing “emissions credits” from firms in the same
sector, or by buying “offset credits” from firms in unregulated sectors.
But does Parliament have the legal authority to implement these proposals? This
paper reviews a string of court decisions that have a bearing on the answer. The
author places emphasis on Parliament’s criminal-law power, because that is the
constitutional basis for the current Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999
(CEPA). The government’s Regulatory Framework proposals will likely take the form
of amendments to that Act, regulations made under that Act, or both. 
The author concludes that the proposals of the Government of Canada for the
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the Regulatory Framework paper are likely
to be upheld as constitutional exercises of the federal criminal-law power.
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regulate greenhouse gas emissions. My
analysis is based on the Government 
of Canada’s policy paper, Regulatory
Framework for Air Emissions
(Environment Canada 2007a),
2 which
represents the current policy of the
federal government.
In the paper I emphasize Parliament’s criminal-law
power, because that is the constitutional basis for
the current Canadian Environmental Protection Act,
1999 (CEPA).
3The Regulatory Framework proposals
will likely take the form of amendments to that 
Act, regulations made under that Act, or both. 
I do not discuss the role of the provinces,
although it is clear that they have the constitutional
authority to regulate emissions from industries
within their borders. All provinces have in fact
announced plans to introduce controls on green-
house gas emissions, and Alberta has actually
enacted a regime of control. But it is obvious that
air is not confined by provincial borders, nor is
competitive economic activity, so some form 
of national regime is required, which does not
necessarily exclude a role for the provinces.
4
The Kyoto Accord, which I describe below,
identifies carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur
hexafluoride as six gases believed to contribute to
global warming. The federal Regulatory Framework
paper proposes to impose limits on emissions of
these gases by large industrial emitters. Regulatory
limits will vary from sector to sector. Each regulated
firm may choose among different options to comply.
They may reduce emission levels to prescribed
levels; make contributions to a climate-change
technology fund; or, comply through a cap-and-
trade system. Under the cap-and-trade system, a
regulated firm can comply by purchasing “emissions
credits” from firms in the same sector, or by buying
“offset credits” from firms in unregulated sectors.
The Kyoto Accord
The Kyoto Accord of 1997
5 is an international
treaty that sets specific targets for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions.
6 The Accord is a
multilateral treaty in which each state signatory
agreed to make reductions in its greenhouse gas
emissions by 2012. Each state signatory chose its
own target, and Canada agreed to reduce its
emissions to 6 percent below its 1990 level by the
year 2012. That target was probably unattainable
even when the treaty was signed in 1997, because
by that time Canada’s emissions had already risen
13 percent above the 1990 level. To move from 13
percent above to 6 percent below against a strong
trend in the opposite direction would have
required immediate government action of the most
draconian kind. No such action was taken. Apart
from financial incentives to improve energy
efficiency and exhortations to voluntary restraint
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in the use of energy –  which measures did not
disturb the upward trend of emissions –  (Jaccard
2006), the federal government did nothing 
to reduce emissions. The growth of Canada’s
population and economy carried emissions ever
upward, making the target completely
unattainable. 
In April 2007, when Ottawa issued the Regulatory
Framework paper, Canada’s emissions were 
33 percent above 1990 levels. The Regulatory
Framework paper (p. 4) says that: “The government
is committed to reducing Canada’s total emissions
of greenhouse gases, relative to 2006 levels, by 20
percent by 2020 and by 60 percent to 70 percent
by 2050.” Note that the benchmark date is now
2006, not Kyoto’s 1990, and the target date is
now 2020, not 2012. And the target for 2020 (20
percent below 2006 levels) is about 19 percent
higher than the Kyoto target for 2012 (6 percent
below 1990 levels). In other words, the many
years of pretending that Canada would meet its
Kyoto target were officially over. 
When the federal government abandoned the
Kyoto target, it lacked a majority in both the
House of Commons and the Senate. It was 
unable to control the legislative agenda, and the
combined forces of the opposition parties led to
the passage of a private member’s bill, the Kyoto
Protocol Implementation Act,
7 which became law
on June 22, 2007. Section 7 of the Act contains
the remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, provision
that, “the Governor-in-Council shall ensure that
Canada fully meets its obligations under . . . the
Kyoto Protocol by making, amending or repealing
the necessary regulations under this or any other
Act.”  (Author’s emphasis added.)
One can only speculate as to what would be
“the necessary regulations” that, after so many
years of government inaction, would suddenly
bring greenhouse gas emissions down to 6 percent
below 1990 levels by 2012 –  five years from the
date of enactment. When the federal government
officially confirmed that it could not meet this
target (EC 2007b), saying that it “would imply a
deep recession,” environmental advocates brought
proceedings against the government in the Federal
Court for breach of its statutory duty under the
Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act.
8 At the time of
writing that case has not come to trial.
Parliament’s Treaty Power (or non-power)     
It is clear that, despite the statutory duty imposed
by the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, Canada
will not comply with the Kyoto Accord. However,
the Accord remains an international treaty that is
binding on Canada as a matter of international law. 
It is important to note, however, that Canada’s
accession to a treaty does not confer on Parliament
any additional legislative power to implement the
treaty. That was decided in the Labour Conventions
case (1937)
9 that struck down federal laws that
attempted to enact national labour standards
(minimum wage, maximum hours and the like) in
order to implement obligations undertaken by
Canada in a multilateral treaty sponsored by the
International Labour Organization. The Privy
Council (then Canada’s highest court) held that
since labour laws were a provincial responsibility
under the division of powers in the Constitution
Act, 1867, they remained a provincial responsibility
even after Canada signed a treaty agreeing to
change its labour laws. Only the provinces could
enact the required implementing legislation.
In the context of the Kyoto Accord, this means
that Parliament cannot use the treaty as the
constitutional basis for a law controlling green-
house gas emissions. Instead, the federal power 
to directly control greenhouse gas emissions must
be based on either Ottawa’s responsibility for
“peace, order, and good government” or criminal
law – powers that exist regardless of the treaty.
C.D. Howe Institute
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Parliament’s “peace, order, and good
government” Power
This Backgrounder assumes that the Regulatory
Framework proposals will be enacted under the
federal government’s criminal-law power, probably
as amendments to the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA) and the regulations
made under the Act. CEPA, as we shall see, was
upheld by the Supreme Court as criminal law in
R. v Hydro-Québec (1997). Before that decision,
the general assumption of constitutional lawyers
was that a nationwide environmental protection
law would have to be enacted under the “peace,
order, and good government” (POGG) power
contained in the opening words of Sec. 91 of the
Constitution Act, 1867.
10
There is no doubt that a federal environmental
protection law could be enacted under the
“national concern” branch of the POGG power.
The Supreme Court so held in R. v Crown
Zellerbach (1988),
11 in which the majority upheld
a federal law that prohibited dumping at sea. The
court determined that marine pollution is under
federal jurisdiction because it is a matter of
national concern that is distinct from  matters of
provincial jurisdiction and is beyond the capacity
of the provinces to control. 
A similar argument can be made about the
control of greenhouse gases. In Crown Zellerbach,
the court did not consider whether the law could
also be upheld under the criminal-law power. 
The probable reason for that omission was that
the case was decided in 1988, and it was not until
1997 that it became clear (from the decision in
Hydro-Québec) that the protection of the environ-
ment (as opposed to the protection of human
health and safety) could serve as a legitimate
purpose of a criminal law.
Parliament’s Taxation Power
Parliament has the power to raise money by “any
mode or system of taxation.”
12 If Parliament chose
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by levying a
“carbon tax” on the production or consumption of
energy, it would have the power to do so. The
only serious limitation on this federal power is
that it cannot tax “lands or property belonging to
any province.”
13 This exception would preclude
the taxation of resources extracted by a province
(but not by private producers) from provincial
Crown lands.
14 However, taxes play no part in the
current Regulatory Framework proposals, although
carbon taxes have been enacted in the provinces of
British Columbia and Québec, and one has been
proposed by the opposition at the federal level. 
The Regulatory Framework proposals do include
the creation of a climate-change technology fund
to which regulated firms can make contributions
in exchange for emissions credits. It is not
described as a taxation measure, but simply as part
of a package of cap-and-trade measures.
Nevertheless, the fund could be set up under
Parliament’s taxation power. The contributions
could be levied as a tax (from which emissions-
compliant firms would be exempt), and the tax
could be dedicated to the technology fund. 
Parliament’s Spending Power
Ever since Canada signed the Kyoto Accord, one
thing the government of Canada has done is to
spend money on the promotion of voluntary
initiatives and monetary incentives for green
renovations, green technology and the like
(Jaccard 2006). The government’s Regulatory
Framework paper (pp. 3-4) also commits Ottawa
to various spending and rebate initiatives. It is
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clear that Parliament, through such programs, can
authorize the expenditure of public money for any
purpose it chooses, including purposes that it
could not directly accomplish by regulation.
15
Parliament’s Criminal-Law Power
SECTION 91(27) OFTHE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867:
The Constitution Act, 1867, by Sec. 91(27),
confers on Parliament the power to make laws in
relation to “the criminal law.”  The courts have
defined a “criminal law” for constitutional
purposes as a law that has three elements: (1) a
prohibition, (2) a penalty and (3) a typically
criminal purpose.
16 And, if one thinks of the
Criminal Code for example, it is true that a
criminal law ordinarily consists of a direct
prohibition of harmful conduct that is to be self-
applied by the persons to whom it is addressed.
There is not normally any intervention by an
administrative agency or official prior to the
application of the law. The law is “administered”
by law enforcement officials and courts of
criminal jurisdiction only in the sense that they
bring to bear the machinery of punishment
(investigation, charge, prosecution, trial, penalty)
against the offender after a breach of the law 
has occurred. 
REGULATION AND CRIMINAL LAW: In the past, the
Privy Council consistently held that Ottawa’s
criminal-law power would not sustain a regulatory
scheme that relied upon more sophisticated tools
than a simple prohibition and penalty. For
example, Parliament’s early efforts to enact a
competition law under its criminal-law power
came to grief in the two cases where the law vested
powers in an administrative agency. The Privy
Council in the first case and the Supreme Court
in the second case held that these powers 
could not be sustained as criminal law.
17 Only 
the provinces could enact regulatory schemes 
of this kind.
Federal efforts to regulate the insurance
industry ran into the same problem. After the
Privy Council struck down a federal statute
purporting to regulate the insurance industry by
licensing, Parliament added a section to the
Criminal Code making it an offence to carry on
the business of insurance without a licence from
the minister of finance. But the Privy Council
held that the “pith and substance” of the new law
was the establishment of licensing authority in the
minister and, accordingly, struck down the law as
an unconstitutional attempt to do indirectly what
Parliament could not do directly.
18 Once again, 
it was the provinces that had the exclusive power
to regulate the insurance industry.
After appeals to the Privy Council ended in
1949, the distinction between regulation and
criminal law did not seem as clear cut to the
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada as it had
seemed to their lordships of the Privy Council.
For example, the court upheld as criminal law 
the provisions of the Criminal Code that
permitted abortions approved by a therapeutic
abortion committee.
19 The Court also upheld the
provisions of the Criminal Code that permitted
lotteries licensed by the provinces.
20 In both 
cases, the criminal prohibition depended on a
discretionary decision by an administrative body.
For present purposes, the truly important
development came in R. v Hydro-Québec (1997).
21
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld, under the
C.D. Howe Institute
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criminal-law power, the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act (CEPA), which is a federal law that
establishes a scheme for the regulation of toxic
substances. Under the Act, the federal ministers of
environment and health have authority to
examine the effects of any substance and to
recommend to the Governor-in-Council that the
substance be classified as “toxic.” Such a finding is
based on a determination that the substance is
harmful to the environment or a danger to human
health. Once classified as toxic, the substance
comes under the regulatory authority of the
Governor-in-Council, which adds the substance
to a schedule of CEPA and may make regulations
governing its release into the environment. 
Hydro-Québec was prosecuted for excessive
emissions of PCBs (which were the subject of an
interim toxic classification). The corporation’s
defence was that CEPA was beyond the reach of
Parliament’s criminal-law power because there was
no prohibition until the administrative process to
classify the substance (or to make an interim
order) was complete. Four judges accepted that
argument, but the five-judge majority rejected it.
The majority held that, because the administrative
procedure for assessing the toxicity of substances
culminated in a prohibition enforced by a penal
sanction, the scheme was sufficiently prohibitory
to be a criminal law. CEPA was upheld, and the
trend of the modern cases to permit an extensive
degree of regulation under the criminal-law power
was emphatically reinforced.
In Re Firearms Act (2000),
22 a challenge was
mounted to Canada’s gun-control legislation,
which is part of the Criminal Code. The Firearms
Act’s main techniques of control consisted of
requirements to register all firearms and to license
all firearms owners. The Supreme Court of
Canada held that the purpose of gun control is
public safety, a typical and justifiable objective of
the Criminal Code. The Act attempted to achieve
that purpose by a prohibition of unregistered guns
and unlicensed owners, backed by penalties. It was
argued that the law was regulatory rather than
criminal legislation because of the complexity of
the regime and the discretionary powers vested 
in the licensing and registration authorities. Only
an outright prohibition of guns, it was argued,
would be a valid criminal law. But the Court
unanimously upheld the gun-control legislation,
relying on its prior decision in R. v Hydro-Québec
for the proposition that the criminal-law power
authorizes complex legislation, including a grant
of discretionary administrative authority before
there is any prohibition. 
Another point that was important in Re
Firearms Act was the holding that a criminal-law
purpose may be pursued by indirect means. For
this finding, the Court relied on its prior decision
in RJR-MacDonald v Canada (1995),
23 which
held that a ban on the advertising of tobacco (but
not an outright ban on the harmful product itself)
was authorized under the criminal-law power. 
Just as the health risks of tobacco did not
require the outright banning of cigarettes, neither
did the safety risks of guns require the outright
banning of guns for it to be justifiable as criminal
law. Measures that would indirectly advance a
legislative purpose, such as the advertising ban in
RJR-MacDonald or the licensing and registration
requirements of the gun-control legislation, are
authorized by Parliament’s criminal-law power.
The line of cases that I have described grants 
to the criminal-law power a considerable capacity
to authorize sophisticated regulation that goes 
well beyond the prohibiting and penalizing of
harmful conduct. Indeed, the success of the
federal government in persuading the Court to
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uphold the regulation of toxic emissions, the 
ban on tobacco advertising and the regime of gun
control under the criminal-law power makes it
hard to predict what kind of federal law would
actually cross the line into the prohibited zone 
of regulation. 
Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The next frontier may turn out to be the proposals
for the control of greenhouse gas emissions in the
federal government’s Regulatory Framework policy
paper (EC 2007a). Despite the narrow five-to-
four majority, R. v Hydro-Québec settles the
constitutionality of CEPA as criminal law. In
2005, the six main greenhouse gases were assessed
under the CEPA process and added to the list 
of toxic substances in the schedule to the Act.
Therefore, the regulatory powers of CEPA apply.
Of course, standards still have to be set, sector 
by sector, for the limits on emissions that will be
required of large industrial emitters under the
regulations. Then, the prohibition and penalty
provided by CEPA will apply to greenhouse 
gas emissions.
At first blush, it seems odd that carbon dioxide,
which is the main greenhouse gas, would be
classified as a toxin, since it occurs naturally in the
air and is benign in its direct effect on life on
earth. But “toxic” is a defined term in CEPA, Sec.
64(a). Part of the definition states: “a substance is
toxic if it is entering or may enter the
environment in a quantity or a concentration or
under conditions that . . . may have an immediate
or long-term harmful effect on the environment.”
The Kyoto Accord is predicated on the belief that
the discharge of greenhouse gases into the environ-
ment in current quantities is causing global
warming with a long-term harmful effect on the
environment. This is enough to satisfy the
definition of toxic in the Act. And this definition
does not raise a constitutional issue since Hydro-
Québec establishes that Parliament’s criminal-law
power is no longer limited to the protection of 
life or health, but also extends to measures for 
the protection of the environment. 
Once emissions standards have been prescribed
by regulation for industrial sectors, firms that fail
to abate emissions as required will be subject to
criminal penalties. In light of the decision in
Hydro-Québec, this is all a perfectly safe exercise 
of Parliament’s criminal-law power. 
However, while in-house abatement will be 
the standard method of compliance with the
regulations, the Regulatory Framework paper also
proposes to introduce three additional means of
compliance. One is the creation of emissions
credits that can be earned by firms that have
reduced emissions below the regulated standard.
These credits can be purchased by those who have
failed to reduce their own emissions to the
required level. 
A second means of compliance is the creation 
of offset credits that can be earned for reductions
in emissions by firms that are in unregulated areas
like agriculture, forestry or landfill operations.
These, too, can be purchased by regulated firms
and used as credits towards the regulated standard. 
The third means of compliance is a contribu-
tion to a government-created but independently
operated climate-change technology fund that
would invest in projects likely to yield reductions
in emissions. 
Can these three additional means of com-
pliance –  emissions credits, offset credits and
contributions to a technology fund –  be upheld
under the federal criminal-law power? Each
enables a regulated firm to meet its obligations
without actually reducing emissions to the
regulated standard. For most kinds of criminal
behaviour, the purchase of exemptions from the
criminal prohibitions would be unthinkable. But
the protection of the environment differs from
other criminal purposes in that it is concerned
with the overall reduction of emissions more than
the individual behaviour of particular emitters. 
Emissions trading allows a market to develop
that provides some choices for private firms as to
the most efficient allocation of the resources
required for emissions reductions. Measures that
are likely to speed up the overall reduction of
emissions are squarely within the purpose of
protecting the environment. This is so even if the
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alternative measures are not themselves
prohibitions of the harmful conduct – like the
prohibition of advertising that was upheld in the
tobacco case. It is likely, therefore, that alternative
means of compliance with the regulated limits 
on greenhouse gas emissions will be upheld as
criminal law.
24
In the case of the emissions credits and offset
credits, their constitutionality seems clear. 
They provide incentives for and then recognize
equivalent reductions in emissions to limits that
the regulated firm is bound to achieve. Since the
goal is to reduce overall emissions, a reduction
anywhere is equally beneficial. 
The constitutionality of the proposed climate
change technology fund is less clear. The
reduction of emissions caused by technology-
funded projects will come long after the
contributions to the fund. And when realized, 
the reduction may not be equivalent to the 
credits issued to the firms that contributed the
money to the fund. However, this exemption is
also directed to the ultimate reduction in
emissions, and is likely to be upheld as a valid part
of the scheme, especially since, according to the
Regulatory Framework paper, it will be available
only for a transitional period and will provide
credit for only part of a regulated firm’s
obligations (70 percent initially, declining
annually to zero in eight years).
Conclusion
My view is that the proposals of the Government
of Canada for the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions in the Regulatory Framework paper,
including the three additional means of
compliance (emissions credits, offset credits and
contributions to a climate-change technology
fund), are likely to be upheld as constitutional
exercises of the federal criminal-law power.
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